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Abstract
Education in a "Job Ladder" Model and the "Fairness-in-Hiring" Rule
Jagdish N. Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan
Education turns a person into a different 'kind of labor. Any economic
analysis of education therefore must be based on a theory as to what this
difference consists in; it must also presuppose a theory as to how the
market for this kind of labor functions. This paper proposes and analyzes,
in general equilibrium, a theory of education that is novel on both dimensions.
As to what education does to an individual, two alternatives are considered:
(i) it provides the needed skills to become employed in better-paying occupations;
and (ii) education has no social productivity but is only an instrument for
job competition in a world where employers feel that it is "fair" to hire
an educated worker in preference to an uneducated one even though they are
equally productive. As for the market for educated labor, we consider a
"Job Ladder" model in which wages are sticky and postulate that , if the
educated labor force exceeds the jobs for which it is qualified, then the
excess supply filters down to the "next-best" job in the "Job Ladder".
The job ladder model is analyzed, therefore, with and without the "fairness-
in-hiring" rule. Each, in turn, is investigated for its equilibrium, efficiency,
and distributional properties vis-a-vis flexible wage models, and the differences
for both the job ladder and the flexible wage models from socially-optimal
solutions are also analyzed.
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I Introduction
Education turns a person into a different "kind" of labor. Any
economic analysis of education therefore must be based on a theory as to
what this difference consists in; it must also presuppose a theory as to
how the market for this kind of labor functions. In consequence,
any theory of education may be distinguished from others on either of
these two dimensions.
In this paper, we propose, and analyze in general equilibrium, a
theory of education that in fact is novel on both dimensions. To appreciate
this, it is useful to distinguish among the different hypotheses about what
education does and about how the market for educated labor functions
,
including in our taxonomy the ideas that we formalize in this paper.
1. What Education Does
(1) The most familiar, and indeed the most obvious as also traditional,
theory of what education does is that education confers skills which are
tantamount to "human capital" formation. This approach has naturally been
developed most extensively by the Chicago school.
(2) The radical economists of present U.S. vintage, on the other hand,
have advanced the interesting view that the role of education is to "socialize"
the educated, breaking them into productive workers in the capitalist economy.
This view, which may be described as the "toilet-training" theory as against
the "training" theory of the human capital variety, leads to no special
wrinkles as far as the divergence between social and private returns to
education is concerned and, on that dimension, is indistinguishable from
the human capital theory.
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(3) An alternative view of education has been advanced by Spence (1973)
and Arrow (1973). In this view, education imparts neither training nor toilet
training. Rather, it acts as a filter, screening and grading the educated.
Education, in itself, is therefore not productive in the sense of imparting
skills or socialization to the educated but it does manage to convey the
information about ability to prospective employers. By acquiring it,
therefore, the ones with ability are able to secure better wages; and hence
education offers a private return. But clearly a divergence between private
and social returns can now arise.
(4) An altogether different view of education however can be that it
is an instrument for job competition. Imagine a job specification with a
certain number of jobs at a wage. If the wage is sticky, an excess supply
of labor at that wage cannot be cleared by lowering the wage. Then, the
access to these jobs, in a competitive system, could imply resort to
either a randomized choice from among the available labor force or another
method of choice from that labor force which otherwise preserves a sense
of fairness . Education can then be perceived as an attribute which,
when acquired, gives a member of this labor force precisely the attribute
which the employer can utilize to prefer him to other (uneducated or
lesser-educated) members of the labor force seeking the jobs. 1 The
sociological principle of job selection then is to prefer those who are
1 An apt example of our fairness-in-hiring rule is provided by the recent
hiring of an Accounts Assistant at the Indian Statistical Institute.
Although the required educational qualification was stated as high school
diploma, the fact of a large number of applicants led the selection
committee to consider only those applicants who had a Bachelor's or
Master's Degree.
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more educated to those who are less: that seems "fair" as the educated
have "put in more" to get the job, even though the job does not "require"
any education at all for satisfactory performance. l The "fairness"
principle of preferring the educated in hiring thus turns education into
an instrument of competition for jobs, yielding therefore a divergence
between private and social returns to education.
1 (i) The obverse of "fairness", of course, is prejudice. Thus, when
jobs are rationed or scarce in relation to applicants, one may not hire
those whom one is prejudiced against: e.g., blacks may be ruled out
from the jobs by white employers. This is discrimination in hiring
rather than discrimination in wages.
(ii) The fairness-in-hiring notion, developed in this paper, extends
also to other phenomena. Thus, men may be hired in preference to women
because "men have to support families" and therefore it is "fair" to
prefer them. This theme has been developed and its similarity to our
fairness-in-hiring rule is noted by Padma Desai (1975).
2 (i) It may be argued that, in some cases, the "fairness-in-hiring" rule
may only be an indirect proxy for screening for better ability. This is
however not necessarily so; and the non-equivalence in reality of the
two alternative hypotheses is evident to us from the fact that employers
typically advertise for jobs, specifying lower educational requirements
than they "settle for", as also from the fact that most educational
qualifications have been "objectively speaking" reduced in terms of their
intellectual input anyway, degenerating often into sheer lapse of time,
energy and financial resources by the candidate (as with law degrees in
India, which are acquired typically via diets of capsuled questions and
answers).
(ii) Next, we may note that labor market imperfection could also account,
in some cases, for the preference for a once-and-for-all upgrading of
educational requirements. Thus, if jobs 1 to n objectively require
increasing qualification but the access to the more-skilled jobs is
partly or wholly biased in favor of those who already hold the less-skilled
jobs (because of unionized rules giving preference to those already within
the organization) , then it could well pay the employer to "overbuild" the
skills at the lower end of the job ladder. This argument however explains
why the employer may advertise for candidates with greater qualifications
than (currently) necessary for a job; it does not really explain why he
would advertise for the job with specification of lesser qualifications
and then hire those who have more.
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2. How the Market for Educated Labor Functions
(1) The functioning of the market for educated labor, in the traditional
neoclassical writings, takes the form of a flexible wage: excess supply of
educated labor leads to a reduction in the wage until the market is cleared.
(2) Alternatively, one can postulate that the wage is sticky and that
the educated laborer, when in excess supply, spills over into open unemployment
(as in standard Keynesian, short-run analysis). The counterpart to this in
trade-theoretic literature is the analysis of a generalized sticky wage in
general equilibrium, as in Brecher (1974) and Lefeber (1971). Such a clearance
of the labor market for educated labor, however, is unsatisfactory, in general
equilibrium analysis, as the educated labor force could always aeek employment
in the uneducated labor market: an idea which we turn to later.
(3) Yet another version of the spillover under the sticky wage is that
introduced by Harris and Todaro (1970) where they equate the employment-rate-
weighted, "expected" wage in the sector with unemployment to the "actual"
wage in the sector with full employment in a homogeneous-labor market model
for analyzing intersectoral migration. This approach would imply that the
excess supply of educated labor would spill over into unemployment, with the
"expected" wage in educated employment then becoming the sticky wage weighted
by the jobs as a proportion of the educated labor force. This is a sensible
assumption if we think of every member of the educated labor force as having
equal, randomized access to the available jobs: i.e. that, in the steady
state, everyone is earning the expected wage and is therefore "underemployed"
rather than "unemployed". Note that this assumption implies that the
average wage to educated labor has indeed been cut but that, unlike with the
flexible wage assumption, the cost of hiring to the employer is not .
-5-
We therefore have here a source of inefficiency in the economic system:
the method of cutting the wage is inefficient.
(4) Finally, we can stick to the sticky wage assumption and instead
assume that if the educated labor force exceeds the jobs for which it is
qualified, then the excess supply filters down to the "next-best" job in the
"job-ladder". Thus the average wage of educated labor is again cut in effect:
for, it is a weighted average of the "best" and the "next-best" wages.
In the model of education that we analyze in this paper, we take the last
assumption on how the labor market works (i.e., we take a job ladder model) and
we analyze its implications for issues such as: Is the system sub-optimal vis-
a-vis a flexible-wage model, would education be overexpanded in such a regime,
and would the private and social marginal product to education diverge?
The job ladder model is reduced to its essential barebones, by assuming
only two non-educational sectors: sector 1 which employs only educated labor
and sector 3 which employs, at identical wage, both educated and uneducated
labor. Sector 2 employs educated labor as teachers at an exogenously specified
student-teacher ratio. The "job ladder" phenomenon is then introduced by
assuming that wage in sectors 1 and 2 is fixed/sticky and that the supply
of educated labor in excess of its employment in sectors 1 and 2 then "spills
over" into sector 3.
Now, in Section II, we compare this model with the flexible wage model
and with the socially optimum solution, in order to examine its economic
implications. This analysis is thus predicated on the assumption that the
top rung in the job ladder, sector 1, uses only educated labor because it
"needs" educated labor. Thus, the job ladder model in this section
presupposes the use of educated labor, in "its" sector 1, as "productive"
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along the lines of the training models: and our theory of education
therefore departs from then essentially in regard to the "job ladder"
assumption: an assumption which leads us to characterize the model
equivalent ly as the "minimum wage" model.
In Section III, however, we proceed to interpret the job ladder model
rather as one where sector 1 employs only educated labor because employers
"prefer" educated to non -educated labor in hiring on the fairness principle:
the fourth assumption delineated above under the sub-section on What Education
Does . Thus both educated and uneducated labor could, in principle, be employed
with equal productivity in sector 1 but the educated enjoy preference in hiring.
Hence, as long as the educated labor force available for employment in sector 1
exceeds the jobs in sector 1 at the fixed wage, sector 1 will hire only
educated labor. Thus, the "job ladder "/minimum-wage model in Section II
applies equally to the case where the "fairness" principle in hiring is in
force. What does change however is the comparison with the flexible wage
model and the social optimum. For, in the flexible wage model with the
"fairness" principle, we would now have to allow for the hiring of uneducated
labor in sector 1 as well: and, with both kinds of labor equally productive
within each of sectors 1 and 3, educated labor supply will fall to zero
even if there is no direct or opportunity cost to getting educated.
Note finally that we will compare the "job ladder" (or "minimum wage")
model with the flexible wage model and with the social optimum solution, in
each of Sections II and III as already explained, using two alternative devices
for handling the education sector: (i) that there is a domestic education
sector which uses educated labor to produce educated labor; and alternatively,
in the Appendix, (ii) that education is undertaken with foreign teachers.
II. The "Pure" Job Ladder Model and Analysis
We now set out the job ladder model in its different dimensions,
describing the production functions, the education sector, the determination
of the wage structure, etc. We also describe, in the process, how the model
modifies if we instead assume a flexible wage. Recall that we will be
interpreting the job ladder model in its "pure" version in Section II
(where sector 1 employs only educated labor because it "needs" educated
labor) and in its "augmented" version in Section III (where sector 1 can
employ both educated and uneducated labor equally at identical wage but
the "fairness" principle in hiring leads to hiring of only educated labor
in sector 1 as long as the supply of educated labor for such employment
is not below the jobs available in sector 1).
1. The Production Functions and Relative Output Prices
We set up the following simple two-sector model which enables us to
capture the essence of the "job ladder" phenomenon without bringing in any
Einessential complications. In sector 1 output is a function f(L, ) only
E
of L
1
the number of educated laborers employed, the production function
Ebeing strictly concave with marginal product f'(L-) being positive for
all L. > and infinite (zero) for L. = (°°) . (One could, if one wishes,
postulate a two-factor production function with the factor other than labor
being kept constant.) In sector 3, output is a linear function wL of labor
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employed. 1 (Again, one could, if one wishes, postulate that sector 3
relates to agriculture in a land-abundant economy.) Let us assume that
our economy is "small" and open in the sense that the relative price of
output of sector 1 to that of sector 3 is exogenous to it. Without loss
of generality we can assume this relative price to be unity.
2. The Education Sector
It is assumed that the only direct costs of education are teaching
costs per unit of time per person in school. We consider two alternative
ways in which the education sector is organized. In the first version,
the education sector is domestic and the teachers are drawn from the pool
of the educated labor force, with the teacher-student ratio exogenously
specified. The direct cost per student year will then equal the teacher-
student ratio times the teacher's wage. In the second version (in the
Appendix) , the direct cost of education is assumed to be payment for
foreign teachers and hence a charge on national income.
3. The Determination of the Wage Structure
The wage of an uneducated laborer is set equal to his marginal value
product w (in terms of the numeraire, the output of sector 1, given the
exogenously-specified relative output price of unity) in the only sector
1 The assumption that educated and uneducated labor in sector 3 have the
same productivity is, of course, the essence of our model. Remember that,
as with all theory, we are building a "stylized" model that focuses on
one central idea. In reality, it may well be that, in certain sectors,
the employment of educated labor, in the long run, may wind up causing
unanticipated productivity gains or that the employment of such labor in
upgraded jobs may even cause loss of productivity due to inaptitude
—
could a Nobel Laureate in Economics sweep the streets well?—or discontent
at the desk.
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eraploying him, namely sector 3. In the minimum wage version of the model,
the wage of an educated laborer employed in sector 1 is set at X.w (X > 1)
and that of a teacher in the domestic education sector at X„w (A > X > 1) .
In the flexible wage version of the model, however, the wage of an educated
laborer as a worker in sector 1 or as a teacher in the domestic education
sector equals his marginal value product in sector 1.
4. The Determination of the Size of the Educated Labor Force
The size of the educated labor force is determined such that, for an
educated worker, the present value of his income stream net of any educational
costs charged to him during his period of education equals the present value
of his income stream had he not educated himself but was employed in sector 3
throughout his working life. More precisely, let the working life of a
worker by T periods, of which the first t periods are spent in school
if he chooses to educate himself. Let the non-negative rate of discount be r.
Let c be the educational costs charged to the worker per each period in
school. Let w be the wage per period of an educated worker. Then,
rT rTft _rT _ f _rT f
-c e dT + w e dT - w
j o J t Jo
e"
rT
dx (1)
Denoting by y the ratio of e dT to e dT, we get then:
fi f l
"
rT
J t •'0
Y w - w + (1 - y)c (1*)
In the flexible wage model, entrepreneurs in sector 1 will then equate the
marginal product of labor in that sector to w. In the minimum wage model,
w will further equal the weighted average of the wages in sectors 1, 2 and 3,
with the weights equalling the proportion of the educated labor force employed
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in each of these sectors respectively. However, in determining c, we will
allow for situations in which c differs from the direct costs of education
as, for instance, in the case where the state subsidizes in full or partially
the costs of education.
5. The Steady State
Except for some brief remarks later, we shall be concerned mainly with
comparison of steady states and not with the dynamic approach to the steady
state. In the steady state it will be assumed that the total labor force
g
is set at unity by choice of units and a portion L of the labor force is
educated. Given that the working life of a person is T periods, of which
t periods are spent in school in the case of an educated worker, it is
t E
clear that the number of persons in school in a steady state is (^jr~r) L .
Let us denote the fraction Op-jr) by <5. Hence the number of students in a
steady state is 6L . Denoting by £ the teacher-student ratio in the
domestic .education sector , it follows that the number of teachers in a
steady state is e6L . Since the employment of educated workers in sector
1 is L
1
,
the number of workers employed in sector 3 will therefore equal
E E
[1 - L. - (1 + e)6L ] in the case of the domestic education sector (and
E E
[1 - L
1
- 6L ] in the case where teachers are foreign).
6. Equilibrium
We discuss at length only the case in which there is a domestic
education sector. As noted already, the case in which the teachers are
foreign is briefly discussed in the Appendix.
Note that the size of the total labor force is given and normalized
at unity and that the employment in the domestic education sector is
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determined once the size of the educated labor force is determined because
of our assumptions of a fixed student-teacher ratio and a steady state.
Hence, the equilibrium values of only two variables, namely the size L
of the educated labor foce and the part of it L.. that is employed in
sector 1, are to be determined. We have also two equations: one that
equates the marginal value product of labor in sector 1 to the relevant
wage rate thus determining the level of employment in that sector and
equation (1') determining the size of the educated labor force.
Finally, the Job Ladder or equivalently the Minimum Wage Model (with
superscript M) will be distinguished from the Flexible Wage Model (with
superscript F) in the determination of wage rate in sector 1. We therefore
proceed now to discuss these two alternative models in detail.
(1) The Job Ladder or Minimum Wage Model
EM
Here the employment L. in sector 1 is determined, given the wage
Aw and the production function f , through the following marginal
productivity equation:
fd™) - X
x
w or I®1 - gCAjW) (2)
where g(*) is the inverse function f. Given our assumptions on f, g(') is
a decreasing function of its argument with g(0) - °° and g(°°) 0.
EMA part of the educated labor force, e6L , is employed as teachers
at a wage rate X-w in sector 2 in the steady state. This means that the
expected wage rate w of an educated worker is a weighted average of the
wage rates X..W, X_w and w in the sectors 1, 2 and 3 respectively, with
T
EM EM
1 1
weights -=jr, e5 and [1 - e6 - (~™)]. Hence, in this case, (1') becomes
L L
yv
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f
X lLf + X2s5L
EH
+ (l- £ 5)LEM -LE
1
M
= w + (1 - y) c (3)
This yields:
Y tt
x
- 1) w - L^1
(1 - y)(w + c) - yw(X
2
- l)e5 U ;
EM EM
This equilibrium solution is meaningful provided (1 - co) L > L.. ,
i.e., the size of the educated labor force net of teachers is at least as
EM
large as the employment in sector 1, and (1 + 6) L < 1, i.e., the educated
labor force and the student body does not exhaust the total labor force.
The first condition will be satisfied provided:
or
and
or
(1 - Y) (w + c) - Yw (X
2
- 1) £5 > (4)
w + (1 - Y) c > yw [X
2
eS + (1 - d5)] (4')
Yw(X
1
-1) (1 - e<5) > (1 - Y) (w + c) - yw(X2
- l)e6 (5)
Yw [X
1
(l - e6) + X
2
e5] > w + (1 - y) c (5')
Now, the RHS of (5
' ) , [w + (1 - y) c], is the opportunity cost (but
f
T
-rx
for a multiplicative factor of e dT ) of education including the
Jo
discounted sum of income foregone and tuition charges. The RHS of (4') is
discounted sum (but for the same factor) of the expected income of an
educated worker when no educated worker is employed in the highest -paying
sector 1. Inequality (4') thus ensures that it is not worthwhile to
educate oneself if the only job opportunity outside sector 3 consists of a
teaching job! On the other hand, the LHS of (5') is the discounted sum
of the expected income of an educated worker when no educated worker is
employed in the lowest-paying sector 3. Thus (5') ensures that this sum
13-
is not below the opportunity cost of education. Thus (4') and (5') together
ensure that the opportunity cost of education lies between the minimum
expected income of an educated worker (when none of them is employed in
sector 1) and the maximum expected income (when none of them is employed
in sector 3).
Finally, the welfare measure W for comparing the outcomes of
different models will be the value of output of sectors 1 and 3 (except in
the Appendix when teachers are foreign, in which case the payments to them
have to be subtracted). Essentially, therefore, we are placing no value
on education as a consumption good. Thus
:
W* = f (Lf ) + w [1 - I™ - (1 + e) <5 LEM ] (6)
(2) The Flexible Wage Model
Turning now to the flexible wage model, we note that there can no
longer be any difference in the wages of an educated worker by sector of
employment. Nor can there be any spill-over of educated workers into
employment in sector 3. Thus, in this model,
L
EF
- (l - e«) L
EF
(7)
hf = €6 L
EF
(8)
L
EF
- (9)
EF -
The size of the educated labor force L is determined by (1') with w
satisfying:
f'CLp - w (10)
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Substituting (10) in (l 1 ), we get
FFf'(Lp = w + (1 - y) c (11)
or
' w + (1 - y) cL
EF
l Y
(11')
This solution is clearly meaningful provided 1 > It =
EFL" > 0, i.e.,
the educated labor force together with the student body does not exceed the
total labor force.
The welfare level attained in this model is given by:
WF = f (LFF ) + w [1- (1 + 5) L
EF
] (12)
(3) The Social Optimum Model
ES
In this model, the size of the educated force L is so chosen as
ES
to maximize welfare, i.e., such that L maximizes f{(l - £<5)L,} + w{l - (1 + 6)L}
with respect to L.
In defining this maximand, we have implicitly taken into account the
fact that all educated workers are used either as teachers or as production
workers in sector 1 and that, given L educated workers, e6L have to be
employed as teachers (since there will be 6L students in school). Thus
the employment in sector 1 is (1 - e5)L and, in sector 3, it is (l - (1 + 6)l).
Maximization of the above function leads to the first-order condition:
f • (1 - e6) L
ES
«
"{VJ* <13>
or
fw(l -• 6)
T ES
8
[ 1 - efi (13')
1 - e<5
It is easy to interpret (13). The mS represents the marginal social product
of an educated worker. The RHS represents the marginal social cost (in terms
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of output foregone in sector 3) of adding one more person to employment in
sector 1: this is so because maintaining one more educated person employed
in sector 1 involves, in the steady state, withdrawing this person from
_5
1 - e5
sector 3 and in addition [6 + 6(e5) + 6(e6) 2 . . . ] = =- students
2 e6
as well as [e6 + (e5) +...]= t- teachers. These persons,
. . 5
.
e6 1 + 6 ... , w(l + 6) , . ,1 + - =- + =- = jt» would have produced —
^
?*- in sector 3.
1 - e6 1 - e6 1 - e6 v 1 - e&
Finally, it is clear that the welfare level attained in this model is:
W
S
= f{(l - efi) LES } + w{l - (1 + 6) LES } (14)
7. The Comparison of Steady States
We will now compare the steady state outcomes of the job ladder model
with those of the flexible wage model on the one hand, and the latter with
those of the social optimum model on the other. The variables whose values
will be compared are: employment in sector 1, the size of the educated labor
force, private and social marginal products of education, welfare levels,
and the share of the educated labor force in total wage income.
(1) The Employment in Sector 1
(A) Minimum vs. Flexible Wages . Comparing the minimum wage and
EM EFflexible wage models, it is easy to see from (2) and (11') that L, : L. ,
This is because g(») is a decreasing function and X.w > w [X (1 - eS) + A2 £<5]
>
w + (1 — y) c
' in view of A. > A and (5'). Thus the flexible wage model
leads to equal or higher employment level in sector 1 than the minimum wage model.
(B) Flexible Wage vg. Social Optimum . Furthermore, comparing the
flexible wage with the social optimum models, we see from (11') and (13) that:
T
EF >
T
ES .. .
T ES .. w + (1 - y) c < w (1 + 5) n ,-^L^ = L
1
- (1 - e6) L according as *—
—
^—
=
—
^ _ £g
(15)
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Rewriting (15) slightly differently, we get
EF >
T
ES .. w
_,
\ 1 -_v| < ,, ., fw(l + 5)
= L, according as — + c H = w(l + 6) + £| —
r
-—-L
n n
L e
7
?
1 < 1
& Y Y > 1-eo (15')
Now, it can be easily shown that for nonnegative discount rates r,
1 1 - Y
— > (1 + 6) and L > 6 with equality holding only for a zero discount
w(l + 6)
rate. Note also that e — -j— is the social cost of schooling per
student year, being the product of the teacher-student ratio e and the
, i c -u «. u w(l + 6)social wage of the teacher,
—
^
t*- .
It is evident, therefore, that as long as a student is charged at
least as much as it costs socially to educate him, employment in sector 1
under a flexible wage model will not exceed the socially optimal level.
This conclusion will hold even if the charge is below social cost, provided
the private discount rate is sufficiently high. Of course, the two
employment levels will be the same if either (i) the students are charged
the social cost of education and the private discount rate is zero (as is
the implicit social discount rate) or (ii) students are charged less than
the social cost of education but the private discount rate is suitably high.
The flexible wage model will lead to overemployment in sector 1 (i.e., to
greater employment than is socially desirable) only if students are charged
less than the social cost of education and the private discount rate is
sufficiently low.
A perhaps more illuminating way of illustrating the effect of private
discount rate and the fee charged to students is to note that if the
education sector itself is privately organized with no subsidies or taxes
from the state, the students will have to pay the direct cost of their
education, namely, the product of the teacher-student ratio e and the wage
of a teacher. In the flexible wage model the latter equals the wage of an
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educated worker in sector 1, which in turn equals the marginal value product
of labor in that sector. Hence we have:
Yf (L^F ) = w + (1 - Y ) e f (L^F )
or
EF f w
l:
1
b
^y - (1 - Y)e
EF ES
Comparing this value of L
1
with L.. we note the two will equal when Y = , , r •
And Y will equal . when the private discount rate is zero, and will be
1 EF
less than
1
- when the private discount rate is positive resulting in L.
ES
being less than L.. . Thus, the fact that individuals have a positive time
preference, while our implicit social rate of time preference is zero, leads
to an under-expansion of the education sector in the flexible wage model even if the
students pay the full market cost of education. A subsidy towards educational
costs will be needed to reach the social optimum in such a situation.
(C) Minimum Wage vs . Social Optimum . Our third and final comparison
of the minimum wage and the social optimum models in respect to employment
in sector 1, on the other hand, is straightforward. As long as the minimum
wage in sector 1, namely X.w, is greater (less) than the social product
of labor —y g—, then L- will be less (greater) than L.. .
(2) The Size of the Total Educated Labor Force
(A) Minimum vs. Flexible Wages . Again, we begin by comparing the
minimum wage and flexible wage models. We first note that, from (3') and (7):
T
EM
flT
EM . Y
(X
1 -
1} W
L t>L, where
1 (1 - Y) (w + c) - yw (X2
- l)eS '
and
T EF 1 T EFL =
r^io- Li
Now, it will be apparent from our earlier analysis that if we set
X,w J
, then L
1
L.. ; i.e., if the minimum wage in sector 1
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is set just equal to what it would have been under a flexible wage model,
the employment in sector 1 would have been the same in the two cases.
However, as is to be expected, for this to be feasible in the minimum wage
model, the teachers also have to be paid the same wage, i.e., X = A .
(For, if A < A then (5') will be violated.) Then, given
i , w + (1 - Y) c ... , ., _, . n 1 ,, „ T E1Aw = Aw = ~ '
,
it follows that o =
_
—
*
as well. Hence L
Suppose next that A is now left unchanged while A is increased.
EM
It is clear then that, as A is increased, employment L
1
in sector 1
decreases. However, 6 increases with A . Hence, 9 will exceed
1 1 - £0
EM EF
and it is therefore possible that L ' could exceed L because of this factor.
EM
We can, however, say more than this. Thus, writing L = 6g(A w) , we get:
EM EM t A n - 1 ,i T EM A -1
l + -A n
A
i
where n is the elasticity of employment with respect to the wage rate
in sector 1. If this (negative) elasticity is less (greater) in absolute
1 EM
value than ? :-, then L will increase (decrease) as A increases.
Thus we conclude that, if the demand for labor in sector 1 is not very
elastic with respect to the wage rate, the minimum wage model will lead
to a larger educated labor force than the flexible wage model in the case
where the specified minimum wage in sector 1 exceeds that under the flexible wage.
So far, in our comparison of the two models, we have kept the wages
of teachersfixed at the value they take in the flexible wage model. Now,
continue keeping A..W (the minimum wage in sector 1) fixed at some value
higher than its level in the flexible wage model; but increase A_. Since
EM EM
A« does not affect L- and an increase of A„ increases 8, L will
increase. Thus, in the case where the demand for labor in sector 1 is not
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very elastic with respect to the wage rate, increasing X and X work
EM EF
in the same direction and result in increasing L above L . However,
if the demand for labor in sector 1 is sufficiently elastic, we will have
FM FF
two opposing effects: while the increase in X will push L below L
,
. EM
a simultaneous increase in A will raise L . The net result could then
clearly go either way.
EF EF
(B) Flexible Wage vs. Social Optimum . Next, since L - (1 - £<5) L
ES x ES EF ES
and L
1
a (1 - £°) L , our earlier comparison of L. and L
1
is equivalent
EF ES
to comparing L and L " and therefore we do not repeat our analysis.
ES
(C) Minimum Wage vs. Social Optimum . The comparison of L with
L ( = 9L- ) is similar to the comparison of L and L , as we proceed to show.
Suppose that the social wage ^fl +/ > is less than w + (1y~ Y> c .
In this case, clearly (3) cannot be satisfied if X w < X w < w (14-6)
2. x z _ i* . as sucn
,
a minimum wage equilibrium cannot exist. If we now raise X
,
so that X w
exceeds
i _ eo* ,
such that a minimum wage equilibrium does exist, L-
will fall below L- while 9 will exceed -=
-r-. Again, the elasticity
EM
of demand for labor in sector 1 will then determine what happens to L
w (1 + §_) w + (1 - Y) cSuppose instead that the social wage ———^T^~ equals -i— .
•\
-v w (1 + 5)If we now set X w X w = —r-* f1T~* tne "»inimuni wage equilibrium is
naturally identical to the social optimum one. Again, elasticity considera: ions
FM F^
will determine whether L will exceed or fall short of L as X , and X ,
are increased from this common value.
The interested readers can readily work out the results for the third
case where "^ +/> exceeds W + (1
y
-
Y) c
.
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(3) The Marginal Product of Education
The private marginal product of education is the difference between
the wage w that an educated laborer expects to earn and the wage of an
uneducated laborer. In both the minimum wage and the flexible wage models,
„,. . „. j i w + (1 - Y) c (l - y ) , ,this is the same and equals *—
-
- w = —-— (w + c) .
The social marginal product of education, on the other hand, is the
difference between the wage of an educated laborer and an uneducated one
w (1 + <S)in the social optimum. This equals —
:
E
r — w.
The difference between the private and social marginal product of
(w + (1 - Y) c w (1 + 6)]i
—r;
i - so*
* T*ie factors influencing
this difference have already been discussed in Section 7(1).
It is also possible to compute a "second-best" social marginal product
to education in the following way. Suppose one more person is educated:
what would be his net addition to output? In the minimum wage model, this
will be zero as long as there are educated workers employed in sector 3,
whereas in the flexible wage model it will equal the private marginal
product to education.
(4) The Welfare Levels
It is obvious that the welfare level w attained in the case of the
social optimum model is the maximum attainable, and as such exceeds VT and w
,
the welfare levels attained in the case of flexible and minimum wage models.
1 The difference between w and W arises only because of the difference in
private and social cost of education. This difference is due to two factors
as we have seen earlier: (i) the difference between c, the cost borne by
the student, and the direct cost of teaching him; and (ii) the fact that private
discount rate is positive while the implicit social discount rate is zero.
Hence if the student pays his cost of education and the private discount
rate is also zero, W*> and WF will be equal. However, if the private discount
-21-
It remains only to compare w
Now:
and W* .
L
EF
e5 l
where 9 (as defined earlier) equals
- f(Lf
1
) - wfl - 6(1 + e) 8 L^1 - L^
Y (*i - 1) w
(1 - Y) (w + c) - Y (X
2
- 1) V
And, using the concavity of f, we then get:
(w* ->] > irt/ T EFv /T EF T FMv* (\ ) (L1 - Lx ) - w
1 + g T EF r,. , _, a .EM T EM
1 - £5 Ll "
5(1 + £) 9 L
l "
L
l
> (fa;!F. w (1 + 6)| EF .EM.
' " (1 - £5) J
al " Ll ' + (°-rM 6 (1 + e) LEM
Now, we have already shown that L.. > L
1
and 6 > _1
1 - e6*
Now f'oJ
F
)
w + (1 - y) c
Y
and, as discussed earlier, will exceed the
w (1+6)
social wage rate —=-*—
F($
as long as the students are charged at least
what it costs society to educate them and the private discount rates are
positive. Hence, in these cases, w > W: the flexible wage model leads
to higher welfare than the minimum wage model.
(16)
rate is positive, then c has to be sufficiently less than the cost of
education to bring about an equality between W*> and W .
Incidentally, it may be worth noting that if we treat c the tuition
fee per student as a policy parameter, increasing it will improve welfare
in the minimum wage model by reducing the incentive to get educated even
though some educated workers are employed in sector 3. In the flexible
wage model, increasing c will improve welfare only if the education sector
is over-expanded relative to the social optimum.
In fact, as we argued, even if the students are charged less, this result
holds provided discount rates are sufficiently high.
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(5) The Share of Educated Labor in Wage Income 1
We finally turn to the income distributional implications of our
educational model. The share a of educated labor in total wage income
can be written as
:
-i Ei
a = zrzi ET i = M, F, S
wV*1 + w[l - (1 + 6) IT1 ]
where w is the expected wage of an educated worker. In the flexible
wage and social optimum models w equals the actual wage of an educated
worker (in sector 1 or sector 2) while in the minimum wage model it equals
the weighted average of the wage rate X w in sector 1, A.w in sector 2
and w in sector 3. However, the private optimization decision regarding
education ensures that this expected wage is the same in the minimum and
flexible wage models.
(A) Minimum vs. Flexible Wages . Hence, we can conclude that
F > M EF > EM
a « a according as L = L , i.e. , according to whether the size of
the educated labor force under a flexible wage model exceeds, equals, or falls
short of that under the minimum wage model: conditions determining the latter
having been already discussed earlier under Section 7(2).
1 Income distributional questions have not been formally investigated in
all theories of education, although the different views regarding education
have led to fragmentary remarks and empirical work, as in Bhagwati (1973b).
However, for a systematic treatment, using the human-capital approach,
see Dasgupta (1975) and an analysis in the screening framework, see
Stiglitz (1975).
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(B) Flexible Wage vs. Social Optimum . As for the comparison of
a and a , however, it is clear that a = a according as w L = w L
T EF 1 T EF , T ES 1 _ES
.'
e .. .. nF > ^SSince L = = f L, and L = •: —f L n , it follows that a = a1 - £0 1 1 - £0 1 <
according to whether the labor income in sector 1 under a flexible wage model
exceeds, equals, or falls short of that under the social optimum model.
Clearly the answer depends in an obvious way on the elasticity of demand for
labor with respect to the wage rate in sector 1.
(C) Minimum Wage vs. Social Optimum . Finally, the comparison of
a and a leads to the similar conclusion that a = a according as
-MEM > -S T ES _' ,. . , T EM flT EM T ES 1 T ESw L w L . In this case , however , we have L = 8 L, , L = z 5- L,
< 1 1 - £0 1
and > -: T-. Thus, in addition to the elasticity discussed above
F S(for the a - a comparison), the factor 8 has to be taken into account
in determining the behavior of the shares. For instance, if the expected
-M -S
wage w exceeds w and the demand for labor in sector 1 is inelastic
M S
with respect to wage rate, then we will find that a ' > a
,
i.e., the share
of educated labor in the minimum wage model will exceed that in the social
optimum model.
8. The Approach to Steady States
We now briefly discuss the approach to steady states. If one postulates
the simple and natural adjustment mechanism that the rate of change of the
size of the educated labor force is proportional to the difference between
the expected life-time discounted income (net of costs of education) of an
educated worker and that of an uneducated worker, then it is easy to see
that the steady states postulated in the earlier sections are reached
asymptotically if the economy is not initially in the steady state provided
-24-
a steady state exists. The crucial equations to examine in this connection
are (3) under the minimum wage situation and (11) under the flexible wage
situation.
It is then immediately obvious that, with our assumptions on the
EF
production functions, a unique solution for L exists in the flexible
wage model. Provided this unique solution does not exceed the available
total labor force net of teachers and students it is also the unique
steady state solution that is approached asymptotically. However, under
the minimum wage situation, if y = 1 (i.e., education requires no time)
and c = (i.e., students are charged nothing for their education), the
LHS of (3) will always exceed the corresponding RHS as long as there is at
least one educated worker. 1 Thus the process of education goes on until
all workers are educated. Thus either y < 1 (i.e., education requires
time or equivalently the opportunity cost in terms of income foregone is
positive) or_ c > (i.e., some of the direct cost of education is passed
on to the students) is a necessary condition for the existence of a
steady state. Of course, these (y or c or combination thereof) have to
be sufficiently high to preclude the situation in which the education
process ends up with everyone educated.
To be exact, we assume that, if initially the size of the total educated
labor force is less than L " (this latter being the level of employment in
sector 1 when the marginal product equals the minimum wage) then each
educated worker receives a wage which exceeds X w.
Ill: Education as a Competitive Instrument:
"Fairness-in-Hiring" in the Job Ladder Model
If we now interpret the sole employment of educated labor in sector 1
as attributable to the "fairness-in-hiring" principle, the analysis of the
job ladder (i.e., minimum wage) equilibrium is not altered. However, we
can no longer analyze the equilibrium in the flexible wage and social
optimum models as in Section II.
Now that educated and uneducated labor are perfect substitutes for
each other in sector 1 as well as sector 3, but education has resource
costs, the size of the educated labor force will fall to zero in both the
flexible wage and social optimum models and together with it therefore also
the employment opportunities for teachers! This means that in both these
situations, the allocation of the labor force between sectors 1 and 2 will
be such as to equate the marginal value productivity of labor in the two
S F S
sectors. Thus L. = L.. and f'(L,) = w. The rest of the labor force,
namely (1-L ), will be employed in sector 3.
S
The welfare level in this case is r f(L ) + w[l-L ].
It is trivially obvious that this exceeds w
,
the welfare under the
minimum wage model. For
W
S
- ^ = f (L^) + w[l - L^] - f <l") - w[l - L^ - (1 + e) 691^ (17)
* f'(L^) [l[ - L*} - w[L^ - L* (1 + e) 69L*] (17')
> w (1 + e) <5 9 L^ > [since f'(I^) - w] (17")
Thus, as is to be expected, when education has no productivity, the minimum
wage model with the fairness-in-hiring rule necessarily leads to a wasteful
creation of an educated labor force.
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IV: Concluding Remarks
In the foregoing analysis, we have provided a general-equilibrium
analysis of a model of education in a job ladder model, with and without the
fairness-in-hiring rule. 1 The analysis has embraced positive aspects as
also efficiency and income-distributional implications.
The job ladder model with the fairness-in-hiring rule, as depicted
in Section III, represents the "pure" version of our theory, emasculating
education of all productivity connotation of the human-capital or
socialization variety. Hence it is the "ideal" version to be compared
with the alternative theories of education in their idealized versions.
In particular, the contrast with the Arrow-Spence screening theory, which
also departs from the productivity principle, should be noted.
Next, note that the analysis can be readily extended to cover the
effects of alternative policy interventions in our job ladder model of
the economy. In particular, we should remark in conclusion that the policy
instrument to counter the fairness-in-hiring rule (whose inefficiency has
been precisely modelled in Section III) is to ensure selection processes
which eliminate the use of (excess) educational attainment as a hiring
criterion. One way in which this can be done is to ensure randomized access
by all qualified and overqualified applicants through the use of a lottery
system. 2 Note however that this would be a second-best policy, since it
1 Note that the presence of the fairness-in-hiring rule requires a job ladder
but the reverse is not true.
2 This has been proposed in Bhagwati (1973a).
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would nullify the fairness-in-hiring rule while continuing the job ladder
economy; 1 the first-best policy would clearly be to eliminate the job
ladder (and hence also the fairness-in-hiring practice) and to restore
full flexibility of wages.
Finally, we should note that no simple theory of education — ours
(job ladder and fairness-in-hiring) or the Schultz-Becker (human-capital)
or the radical (socialization) or the Arrow-Spence (screening) — is likely
to fit all of the educational system in any country. If we had to generalize
at the peril of oversimplification, we would guess that the fairness-in-hiring
theory is likely to apply most to liberal arts education in the less developed
countries with developed educational systems inherited from progressive
colonial governments (e.g. in Asia)* the screening theory most to liberal
arts education in the developed countries, and the human-capital doctrine
to technical and scientific education in both LDC's and DC's.
The counterpart of this, in the Arrow-Spence screening theory, would be
the question: Is there a cheaper way of screening than using the educational
system? This question has been discussed in Taubman and Wales (1973).
" For an application of our theory of education to the welfare analysis of
the brain drain problem of less developed countries (LDC's) , see Hamada
and Bhagwati (1975).
Appendix: The Foreign Teachers Model
We discuss briefly the implications of assuming that the education
sector is operated exclusively by hiring foreign teachers. Let us assume
that the payment to foreigners per student is k in terms of the numeraire.
Ei
Naturally the payment to foreigners, k<5L [i = M, F or S], has to be
subtracted now from the sum of the values of output of sectors 1 and 3 to
arrive at welfare levels.
Now, since only c, the fees charged per student, enters the private
cost calculations of the flexible and minimum wage models, the parameter k
is irrelevant for this purpose. However, recall that the teacher-student
ratio plays a role in the determination of equilibrium when domestic
teachers are assumed. So, now we must set e = to obtain the equilibrium
values of the size of the educated labor force in the minimum and flexible
wage models from equations (3') and (7). However the welfare levels will now be:
\P = f (L^) + w [1 - l!J - 5L
M
] - k6L
M
W
F
= f (lZ) + w [1 - (1 + <5)L
F
] - k6lT
The fact that payment to foreign teachers has to be subtracted also
affects the maximand in the social optimum model. Thus we maximize
f (L) + w [1 - (1 + 6) L] - k6L with respect to L. This leads to
f*(LS ) = w(l + 5) + k<5
This is the analogue of (13) and has a similar interpretation. The LHS is
the social product of an educated laborer while the RHS is the social cost
in terms of output foregone in sector 3 (from the withdrawal of (1 + 6) persons,
-28-
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one person being added to the educated labor force and o persons to the
student body) plus the direct cost of education equalling k per person
in the educated labor force.
Comparisons of the sort made in Sections 7(1) to 7(5), in the context
of the present models with foreign teachers, lead to similar results as in
those sections provided it is understood that the direct social cost of
education is k. per student.
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